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Abstract
Background This paper examines two state-led public–
private demand-side financial support programs aiming to
raise hospital delivery rates in two neighbouring Indian
states—Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh. The national Janani
Suraksha Yojana (JSY) was complemented with a public–
private partnership program Janani Sahayogi Yojana
(JSaY) in Madhya Pradesh in which private obstetricians
were paid to deliver poor women. A higher amount was
paid for caesarean sections (CS) than for vaginal deliveries
(VD). In Gujarat state, the state program Chiranjeevi
Yojana (CY) paid private obstetricians a fixed amount for a
block 100 deliveries irrespective of delivery mode. The two
systems thus offered an opportunity to observe the influ-
ence of supplier-induced demand (SID) from opposite
incentives related to delivery mode.
Methods The data from the two programs was sourced
from the Departments of Health and Family Welfare,
Governments of Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh, India.
Results In JSaY program the CS rate increased from
26.6 % (2007–2008) to 40.7 % (2010–2011), against the
background rate for CS in Madhya Pradesh, of only 4.9 %
(2004–2006). Meanwhile in CY program in Gujarat, the CS
rate decreased to 4.3 % (2010–2011) against a background
CS rate of 8.1 % (2004–2006).
Conclusions The findings from India are unique in that
they not only point to a significant impact from the intro-
duction of the financial incentives but also how disincen-
tives have an inverse impact on the choice of delivery
method.
Keywords Maternal and child health  Caesarean 
Institutional delivery  Health insurance  India
Significance
The observations provide the clearest indication of SID
influence on the choice of delivery method so far reported
from any country.
Introduction
Medical ethics assume that interventions and procedures
are decided purely on the basis of clinical evidence and
expected beneficial outcomes for the patient, and certainly
not by provider financial considerations. The Federation of
Obstetrics and Gynecology (FIGO) Committee for the
Ethical Aspects of Human Reproduction stated that:
‘‘performing caesarean section for non-medical reasons is
not justified’’ [1]. The Indian Medical Council Act on
Profession and Ethics declares that the ‘physician’s prime
objective is rendering services to humanity and rewards or
financial gains would be subordinate’ [2].
Nevertheless, there exists ample theoretical literature
related to the concept of supplier-induced demand (SID) in
the health sector. SID is seen as an example of what
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economists call externalities, an unintended side-effect of
an economic interaction, resulting from the lop-sided
principal-agent relationship, as it is called in organizational
theory, between the patient and the physician. Economic
transactions typically involve two parties, a seller and a
buyer, whereas in the health sector the role of the buyer
(the patient) is mediated by agents (the physician and
sometimes the financing agency). The assumption is that
the agent acts on behalf of the principal (patient) with only
the best interests of the principal as guidance. If the agent is
influenced by personal financial incentives to provide more
or less services, more expensive services or other services
than what would be in the best interests of the principal, it
will be a case of SID. Anecdotal evidence exists to support
the belief that SID is not uncommon in the health sector
and that it may have considerable influence on the quantity
and contents of health services. This influence has, how-
ever, been difficult to demonstrate with empirical evidence
since there are typically many potential confounders which
are uncontrollable in observational studies [3].
Leone concluded in an analysis of data from the third
District Level Household Survey (DLHS) in India that
supply factors may contribute to the rise in the CS rate in
India. She noted also that further research is needed to
understand whether the demand for institutional deliveries
is compromised by pressures for overmedicalization [4].
The increasing obstetric activities, in terms of hospital
admissions and surgical interventions, in Denmark were
noted by Vallgarda. Her concluding suggestion was that,
even if not proven, the increased obstetric activity would
seem to be ‘‘obstetrician induced labour’’ [5].
Brazil has one of the highest caesarean section rates in the
world, which has stimulated research both related to the
health consequences for mother and child, and to the causes
behind the high rates. We have reviewed 153 papers on
caesarean section in Brazil, of which 17 were found to have a
broad relevance to the topic of reasons for choosing cae-
sarean delivery. However, only one of the papers explicitly
mentioned the concept of supplier-induced demand and none
of the papers presented evidence for impact of provider
payment related financial incentives. Health economics lit-
erature discusses anecdotal evidence of supplier-induced
demand. Data-based empirical evidence is rare, as noted
above.
Against the background of the high maternal mortality
ratio and the call of the Millennium Development Goal 5
(MDG5), the Central and State governments of India have
implemented financial support programs as part of a
strategy to increase institutional intrapartum care to reduce
maternal mortality. The Indian health care system is
characterised by a dominant private health sector largely
financed out-of- pocket by users.
Objectives and Significance
This paper examines two state-led public–private initia-
tives to raise hospital delivery rates in two neighbouring
Indian states—Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat. The federal
government program, the JSY, is a conditional cash
transfer paid to the mothers when they present to deliver in
a facility [6]. The program has been implemented largely
through public sector facilities. However, the JSY also
allows the accreditation of private hospitals to increase
coverage. In Madhya Pradesh (MP), the state initiated a
public–private partnership sub-program in 2007. The
partnership was called the Janani Sahayogi Yojana (JSaY).
Under the JSaY, private sector obstetricians were remu-
nerated by the state for deliveries, notably involving higher
reimbursements for caesarean deliveries than for vaginal
deliveries, 4530INR and 800 INR respectively, gradually
increasing to 5500INR and 1200INR, before being phased
out in 2012 [7]. The JSaY program was small in volume;
not more than 5000 beneficiaries benefited from the pro-
gram before it was scaled down [8].
The CY program in neighbouring Gujarat state, which
commenced statewide in 2007, is similar to the JSaY
program in that it is a state-led public–private initiative,
wherein private sector obstetricians are paid by the state to
provide delivery services to underprivileged women. An
important difference from JSaY, however, is that the
reimbursements involve a fixed amount payment for a
block of 100 deliveries, regardless of the proportion of
vaginal and caesarean deliveries. The payment was calcu-
lated on the estimate of an average of 85 normal and 15
complicated deliveries, seven of which would require a
caesarean section [9]. The CY program has been larger,
with nearly 800,000 beneficiaries to date. The program is
still in operation.
Thus, the CY maternal support program has a built-in
financial disincentive designed to discourage unnecessary
caesarean sections, which are more resource demanding,
but not individually compensated for in the package. The
JSaY maternal support program, on the contrary, com-
pensates for the extra resources required for an individual
caesarean section. Consequently a higher rate of caesarean
deliveries will lead to overall higher revenue for the
facility. To the extent that the higher reimbursement for a
caesarean involves overcompensation, an incentive to
supply more exists.
The objective of our study was to compare and assess
the impact of the opposite supplier incentives in the two
programs. The importance of our study is that it can con-
tribute to a better understanding of what factors are driving
the world-wide trend towards increasing caesarean section
(CS) rates.
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Methods and Data
Study setting: Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh states in India.
Gujarat, a large state on India’s western flank, has a pop-
ulation of 60.1 million inhabitants, over half of whom live
in rural areas (57.4 %). The state is socio-economically
relatively wealthier than other Indian states. Gujarat ranks
as India’s third richest state based on GDP per capita. The
state has a strong private health sector, with private
obstetricians practicing in small towns in the interior areas
of districts. 60 % of all births in the state take place in
private health facilities. Madhya Pradesh (MP) is eco-
nomically poorer, over two-thirds of MP’s 72 million
population is rural. A third of all inhabitants live below the
poverty line. The private health care sector in Madhya
Pradesh is smaller and confined to large cities. A descrip-
tion of each state is provided in Table 1 below.
The data from the two programs for this paper was
sourced from the Departments of Health and Family
Welfare, Government of Gujarat and Government of
Madhya Pradesh. Both departments of health collect data
from all facilities participating in the respective programs
each year. These are shown in Table 2, below. The CS rate
was calculated as a proportion of all births that occurred
under the respective programs.
In each program, privately owned facilities were eligible
to participate in the programs if they met certain criteria
which included having a qualified obstetrician, a delivery
room, an operating theatre and access to an anaesthetist.
Data to estimate background rates of caesarean sections
(baseline prior to the programs) in the states were accessed
from the District Level Household Survey (DLHS-3) [8].
The DLHS-3 was reported in 2007–2008 but refers to
births that occurred between 2004 and 2006 (i.e. the actual
survey period), and therefore serves as appropriate baseline
for pre-program CS rates.
Descriptive statistical analysis was performed to mea-
sure the association between the respective maternal sup-
port systems and CS rates by year.
Results
We report here on how the CS rates among program ben-
eficiaries in private hospitals participating in the two dif-
ferent programs have changed in opposite directions after
the programs, with provider financial incentives working in
opposite directions, were introduced. As can be seen in the
graph (Fig. 1), the trends are dramatically different in the
two programs.
In JSaY in MP (program with differential payments for
caesarean and vaginal delivery) the CS rate increased over
four years, from 26.6 to 40.7 % in the participating private
hospitals. This trend is all the more surprising, given that
the background rate for caesarean deliveries in Madhya
Pradesh, where the JSaY was implemented, was only
4.9 % [10]. Meanwhile in CY program (bundled payment
per block of 100 deliveries), the CS rate was close to 6 %
with a slightly decreasing trend over the 4 years, with a
low 4.3 % rate in 2010–2011. Gujarat state where this
program is implemented had a higher than Madhya Pradesh
background CS rate of 8.1 % [11].
Discussion
The two maternal financial support programs differ with
respect to their impact on CS rates. The opposite financial
incentives in the two programs clearly indicate a remark-
able influence of SID on the choice of delivery mode under
the two programs in the two states in India. From China a
dramatic increase in caesarean deliveries has been reported
with possible links to the introduction of the New Rural
Cooperative Medical Scheme [11]. Huang et al. [12] con-
cluded that the majority of the extremely high proportion of
caesarean deliveries in Anhui province, China, resulted
from decisions by the women themselves. Yet, even when
the women had the final say, influence from physicians
cannot be ruled out. The findings that we report from India
are unique in that they not only point to a huge impact from
the introduction of the financial incentives but also how
disincentives have an inverse impact on the choice of
delivery method. The observations provide the clearest
indication of SID influence on the choice of delivery
method so far reported from any country.
Both programs were for underprivileged women only.
Chaturvedi et al. [13] studied written case vignettes for
haemorrhage and eclampsia in the JSY program at 73
facilities in Madhya Pradesh and concluded that birth
Table 1 State characteristics, Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat
State Gujarat Madhya Pradesh
Total populationa 60.4 million 72 million
Population below poverty line
(eligible population)b
16.6 % 31.5 %
MMRd 122 230
IMRc 36/1000 54/1000
Literacya 79 % 70 %
a Census of India 2011
b Poverty estimates 2011–2012, Govt of India(Tendulkar method)
http://planningcommission.nic.in/news/pre_pov2307.pdf
c Sample registration system bulletin, Sept 2014, Registrar General,
India http://censusindia.gov.in/vital_statistics/SRS_Bulletins/SRS%
20Bulletin%20-Sepetember%202014.pdf
d Special bulletin on MMR 2010–2012, Registrar General, India
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attendants in the facilities had low competence leading to
inability to manage obstetric complications, which obvi-
ously is a cause for concern in the perspective of increasing
CS rates.
The background CS rate in the population was low in both
states, 4.9 and 8.1 % in MP and Gujarat respectively (the CS
rate in private sector facilities is likely to be higher than the
background rates). The CS rates for underprivileged women,
before the programs, were lower than for the general popu-
lation. We estimate that the CS rate for this category of
women without access to the programs to be around 2 %.
The increase in caesarean deliveries may have saved the lives
of poor women, who previously faced financial barriers to
access emergency obstetric care. However, we do not believe
that the high and increasing CS rate in the Madhya Pradesh
JSaY program did reflect a higher and increasing medical
need. We suggest that the increase was induced by the pro-
CS financial incentives in the JSaY program. Conversely, the
CS rate among the eligible beneficiaries in the CY program
was much lower, with a tendency to decrease, consistent with
the embedded disincentive.
Conclusions
The findings from our analysis of the two financial support
programs to increase institutional intrapartum care to
reduce maternal mortality are unique in that they not only
point to a significant impact from the introduction of the
pro-CS financial incentives, but that they also show how
provider payment financial disincentives have an inverse
impact on the choice of delivery method. The observations
provide the clearest indication of SID influence on the
choice of delivery method thus far reported from any
country.
Worldwide, CS rates are increasing, a phenomenon
coincidental with the drive to increase facility delivery
rates in order to meet MDG 5. A growing number of
hospitals apply fee systems or provider payment systems as
a basis for paying for hospital services, which may or may
not introduce financial incentives for supplier-induced
demand related to caesarean deliveries. We believe that our
observations provide arguments to carefully assess the
potential influence of provider payment incentives on the
choice of delivery modes when introducing or reforming
payment mechanisms.
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